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Daniel Koretz
Test-Based Educational Accountability
Research Evidence and Implications
Abstract: In recent years, many nations, including Germany, have begun to use students’ scores
on achievement tests to monitor the performance of schools and educational systems. Such sys-
tems have been in place for a considerable time in a few nations, notably the United States, and
numerous studies of their effects have been conducted. While these studies are limited, they are
sufficient to reveal serious problems that should be confronted as new systems are put in place in
other nations. Research in the U.S. has shown two related types of problems in test-based ac-
countability (TBA) systems. Studies have revealed a mix of positive and undesirable effects on
teaching and other aspects of educational practice. Research has also shown that increases in
scores can become seriously inflated. That is, scores can increase by a larger amount – in some
cases, a far larger amount – than actual improvements in student learning warrant. This paper
summarizes studies of score inflation, describes several mechanisms that produce it, and notes
implications for evaluation, testing, and the design of accountability systems.
1. Score Inflation
In 1975, Donald Campbell wrote what has come to be called Campbell’s Law: “The
more any quantitative social indicator is used for social decision making, the more sub-
ject it will be to corruption pressures and the more apt it will be to distort and corrupt
the social processes it is intended to monitor” (Campbell 1975). This corruption of in-
dicators has been found in many different fields, including health care, social services,
and environmental regulation. (For a description of many examples, see Rothstein
2008.)
In education, Campbell’s Law can take many forms because a variety of measures
can be used in accountability systems. For example, some systems in the United States
have used dropout rates or attendance rates in addition to test scores. Most of these in-
dicators are subject to the corruption about which Campbell warned. Inflation of test
scores, however, is a particularly significant instance of Campbell’s Law because of the
centrality of scores in current accountability systems and their importance for the pub-
lic’s perception of the success or failure of the educational system.
It is useful consider two types of score inflation that that have different causes. The
first category of inflation is created by changing the group of tested students – for ex-
ample, by excluding students from lower-scoring groups or by reclassifying students in
a way that helps to raise aggregate scores (see, for example, Figlio/Getzler 2002; Jacob
2005). These forms of gaming can substantially distort aggregate scores, such as school
averages or the percentages of students reaching performance standards. However, they
need not bias the scores of individual students, and they are therefore not of psycho-
metric interest. The second category of inflation arises from actions that bias not only
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aggregate scores, but also the scores of individual students. The balance of this paper
considers only the latter type of inflation, which appears to be the primary cause of the
most serious instances of inflation in the U.S. research literature.
The principle underlying score inflation of the latter type is that most achievement
tests are only small samples from much larger domains of achievement. For example,
responses to the small sample of items on a mathematics test are used as a basis for in-
ferences about mastery of the mathematics learned over one or many years of educa-
tion. In this way, a test is analogous to a political poll, in which the responses of a rela-
tively small number of people are used to estimate the preferences of a far larger group
of voters. In a poll, one samples individuals, while in a test, one samples behaviors from
an individual’s larger repertoire, but the fundamental principal is the same: using the
sample to estimate the larger set from which it is drawn. For this reason, scores are only
meaningful to the extent that they justify an inference about the larger whole. That is,
the validity of inferences depends on the extent to which performance on the tested
sample generalizes to the much bigger, largely untested domain of achievement.
This principle leads to the design of most studies of score inflation and some studies
of educators’ responses to test-based accountability. If teachers and students respond to
the pressure to raise scores by focusing too much on the tested sample rather than the
domain as a whole, performance on tested content will increase more than unmeasured
performance on untested content, and scores will rise faster than real mastery of the
domain. If this is not occurring and observed increases in scores do generalize to the
domain, they must also generalize to other tests of the same domain – that is, to other,
similar samples. However, if students and teachers are focusing too much on the specific
sample tested, they will generate test-specific gains that do not generalize to the domain
and that are not reflected in other tests of the same constructs. Therefore, most studies
of score inflation in the U.S. have compared gains on a test used for accountability
(usually called the high-stakes test) to gains on another test of the same domain (often
called the audit test). In the absence of inflation, the trends in scores should be similar,
although not identical. Similarly, some studies of teachers’ responses to test-based ac-
countability have investigated behaviors that entail excessive focus on the content or de-
tails of the high-stakes test.
Few detailed studies of score inflation have been carried out, in part because they are
politically controversial. These few studies indicate that score inflation is common and
that it can be very large. Two clear examples can be found in evaluations of the high-
stakes testing program implemented in Kentucky in 1992. In this program, all schools
were given numerical targets for increases in scores in numerous subjects for each two-
year period. Increases substantially greater than the target earned a school cash rewards
(which could not be used to augment teachers’ salaries), while gains sufficiently below
the target could bring sanctions. The legislature required that the new tests (called
KIRIS) reflect the framework used to construct the National Assessment of Educational
Progress (NAEP), which is a low-stakes, sample-based assessment. Therefore, NAEP,
which was administered to representative samples of Kentucky students, was an appro-
priate audit for KIRIS.
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Over the first two years of the KIRIS program, the average fourth-grade reading score
on KIRIS increased by 0.76 standard deviation. This was a suspiciously large increase;
U.S. data from tests not subject to score inflation suggest that large-scale changes rarely
average more than 0.04 standard deviation per year (see, for example, Koretz 1986).
During the same period, the performance of the state’s fourth grade students on the
NAEP reading assessment declined by a trivial 0.03 standard deviation (Hambleton
et al. 1995). Over the first four years of the program, eighth-grade students’ mean score
on the KIRIS mathematics test increased by 0.52 standard deviation. During the same
period, the state’s mean score on the NAEP mathematics test increased only about one-
fourth as much, 0.13 standard deviation. The increase on NAEP in the state was similar
to that in the U.S. as a whole (Koretz/Barron 1998). Several other studies have found
disparities similar to these (Jacob 2005, 2007; Klein et al. 2000; Koretz et al. 1991).
Research has shown not only that score inflation can be very large, but also that it is
highly variable from school to school. Moreover, we still know little about factors that
predict which schools’ scores are most inflated. Indeed, we lack good tools for identify-
ing variations in inflation because we rarely have a reasonable audit test that is adminis-
tered regularly in all schools.
The result is that the many of the most important inferences based on scores can
badly biased. In the absence of confirmatory evidence, neither the large aggregate in-
creases in scores that often accompany test-based accountability nor relative differences
in gains among schools can be trusted.
2. A Model of Test Construction
The primary theoretical response to this problem has been the work of Koretz and col-
leagues (Koretz/McCaffrey/Hamilton 2001; see also Koretz/Hamilton 2006),who suggest
a new model of test construction to better explain score inflation and to guide investiga-
tions of educators’ responses to test-based accountability.
The model begins by considering all elements of performance that are given sub-
stantial emphasis either by the test or in the inferences users base on test scores. These
performance elements may be finer-grained than individual test items. Many are sub-
stantive, that is, related to the intended inference. However, some performance elements
are non-substantive, unrelated to the intended inference. The authors of tests must
make decisions about the format of test items, the type of representations used (for ex-
ample, whether an algebraic problem is presented graphically or pictorially), the rubric
used to score the item, and so on. Although some of these choices will be related to the
intended inferences, many will not be. Elements that are unrelated to the inference may
nonetheless have an appreciable impact on students’ performance on the test, particu-
larly if training focuses on them.
Each element that is tested has an effective test weight, which is the influence per-
formance on that element has on the test score. This weight, which can reflect both con-
tent emphasis and technical factors such as item discrimination, is the partial derivative
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of scores with respect to the element. That is, where
i
π is a performance element and
θ is the score, the test weight of the element is:
Koretz et al. (2001) refer to the construct or domain about which inferences are drawn
as the target of inference. The target, like the test, comprises a set of performance ele-
ments, which are given inference weights that reflect the importance of the elements to
the inference based on scores. However, the test and target differ in important ways. The
target, unlike the test, is often only vaguely and incompletely defined. For example, even
though the test specifications for a mathematics test are generally quite specific, the in-
ferences users base on scores are often simple and vague. The target is larger and gener-
ally gives substantial weight to elements that are not tested. Elements included in the
test may have test weights that differ from their inference weights.
The test and its target of inference can be viewed as two vectors of weighted per-
formance elements, as in Figure 1. Elements 1 through j in the top block of Figure 1 are
included in both the test and the target. Therefore, their test weights
i
λ and their corre-
sponding inference weights
i
ω are non-zero, but they may not be proportional. Apart
from possible differences in weighting, this block of performance items is not problem-
atic.
Fig. 1: A test and a target of inference as weighted vectors
of performance elements
The second block, subscripts j+1 to k, comprises performance items that are important
for the inference but are omitted from the test and therefore have test weights of zero.
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When the inference is about a broad domain of achievement, this block of untested
elements is typically very large.
The final block of elements, beginning with k+1, comprises elements that are in-
cluded in the test but are not important to the inference and therefore have inference
weights of zero. These elements reflect decisions by the test authors that are not sub-
stantively important. This focus on substantively unimportant performance elements is
an important difference between the framework proposed by Koretz et al. (2001) and
the otherwise somewhat similar model of validity subsequently suggested by Kane
(2006). As the examples below indicate, these non-substantive performance elements
may be an important source of score inflation.
3. Educator’s Responses to Testing
Koretz and colleagues (Koretz/McCaffrey/Hamilton 2001; Koretz/Hamilton 2006) sug-
gest grouping educators’ responses to test-based accountability into seven categories.
On the positive side, educators may spend more time teaching, work harder, or find
more effective methods of teaching. Within limits, all of these responses are likely to
produce meaningful gains in scores, that is, increases in scores that mirror real
improvements in student learning. At the other extreme, both educators and students
may simply cheat, which can produce only score inflation. (For an ever-growing
account of cheating incidents in the U.S., see http://www.caveon.com/citn/index.php.)
More interesting are the three remaining categories of responses to testing, labeled
reallocation, alignment, and coaching, that can produce either score inflation or mean-
ingful gains.
Reallocation refers to shifting instructional resources to better match the sampling of
content by the test. In the terminology above, this is shifting instructional resources
among substantive performance elements so that the emphasis in instruction better
matches the effective test weights. Perhaps the most important of these resources, and
the most often studied, is instructional time (see, for example, Stecher 2002), but other
resources may be reallocated also, such as homework assignments. Other resources that
are only indirectly under the control of educators may be reallocated as well, such as
students’ effort and parental pressure.
Reallocation of instructional resources, if effective, reallocates achievement. Whether
it increases achievement – to be more precise, whether it increases the achievement that
the test score is designed to estimate – depends on the nature of the reallocation.
Reallocation may occur between subjects – for example, time may be taken away
from untested subjects and added to tested ones (e.g., Stecher/Barron 1999). This is par-
ticularly likely in the elementary grades in which individual teachers teach multiple sub-
jects. Reallocation between subjects is an important issue for education policy, but it is
usually not relevant to score inflation. For example, if schools in the U.S. take time away
from subjects that are not tested for accountability (such as history in most states) to
add time to subjects such as mathematics that are tested, this will presumably reduce
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learning in history, but it does not undermine the validity of inferences about mathe-
matics achievement based on test scores.
Reallocation may also occur within subjects, as teachers shift resources from mate-
rial that receives little or no emphasis on the test to content in the same subject that is
likely to be emphasized by the test. This form of reallocation, which has been found in
numerous studies in the U.S. (for example, Koretz et al. 1996), may create either mean-
ingful gains in scores or inflation.
Whether within-subject reallocation causes score inflation depends on both the con-
tent that receives more emphasis and that which receives less. The validity of an infer-
ence about gains depends on the extent to which improvements in performance on the
tested vector of performance elements supports an inference about improvements on
the entire vector relevant to the inference, including the many performance elements
that are untested. Therefore, inflation arises if reallocation increases performance on
tested performance elements substantially more than it improves mastery of untested
elements that are important for the inference. If teachers take away time from untested
performance elements that are important for the inference and students learn less about
them as a result, that deterioration will not appear in scores. Similarly, if teachers focus
on elements have substantially larger test weights than inference weights, gains will be
exaggerated.
Note that even when it causes score inflation, reallocation need not bias estimates of
performance on specific elements. Rather, the bias arises from aggregating the tested
performance elements into a composite score. When inflation occurs, changes in that
composite do not represent proportionate changes on the target.
In the United States, a core element of accountability policies is “alignment.” States
accepting funds under the federal No Child Left Behind Act – currently, all states – are
required to establish “content standards” that describe what students should know and
be able to do, and “performance standards” that indicate the level of proficiency stu-
dents are expected to show with respect to the content standards. States must then cre-
ate tests that are aligned with these content standards, and the use of these tests is in-
tended to induce instruction that is similarly aligned with standards.
Advocates of current accountability programs often insist that this alignment pro-
tects against score inflation. Their argument is that if tests are aligned with standards,
they are measuring important content, and if teachers focus instruction on the test, they
are therefore necessarily focusing instruction on important material. They then argue
that focusing on important material cannot produce inflation. This argument is incor-
rect. Clearly, some degree of alignment is good; one would not want tests that encour-
aged a focus on unimportant material. However, alignment is just a special case of real-
location, and the same principle applies: inflation depends not only on the material that
gains additional emphasis, but also on the material that loses emphasis. Because tests
are small samples of behavior, they typically constitute only a sample from the stan-
dards. Therefore, teachers can align their instruction with the test while still deempha-
sizing material that is important for the inference about students’ mastery of the stan-
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dards. In other words, focusing on important material, while desirable, is not sufficient
to prevent score inflation.
The term coaching is used loosely and inconsistently in writing about testing. Here
we follow the specific usage suggested by Koretz et al. (2001), who used the term to de-
scribe various forms of test preparation that focus on details of the test. Some of these
details might be called substantive but unimportant: they are in some way related to the
target, but they are not important for the inference. For example, suppose that a
mathematics assessment is supposed to measure students’ understanding of basic prin-
ciples of plane geometry. In designing this test, one would need to make many decisions
about how plane geometry should be represented. Some of these decisions may reflect
the target of inference, but many will not. For example, should irregular polygons be
presented, or only regular ones? What is the maximum number of sides in the figures
that will be presented? If estimation is included in the inference, will it be extended to
the plane geometry items, or will these require only calculation of areas, and perime-
ters? If triangles are presented, which attributes of triangles are tested? Such decisions
are unavoidable, but some are not relevant to the inference based on test scores.
These decisions are often repeated from one instance of testing to the next. There
can be many reasons for such repetition of details, but some recurrences are not impor-
tant for the inference. For example, some repetition occurs simply because developers
have limited resources or because they do not understand the unintended consequences
of the repetition.
Under low-stakes conditions, repetition of details may not be problematic, and tra-
ditional psychometric theory does not pay it much attention. However, repetition be-
comes very important under high-stakes conditions because it offers opportunities for
coaching. For example, in one study, an American secondary school teacher asked one
of my students, “Why would I teach irregular polygons?” She was not questioning the
importance of irregular polygons. She asked the question rhetorically because her state’s
test virtually never includes them. Examination of American test-preparation materials
shows many examples of focusing on recurrent details of this sort. Koretz et al. (2001)
referred to this as substantive coaching.
Nonsubstantive coaching is similar but focuses on focuses on non-substantive per-
formance elements – elements that are unrelated to the target – which recur from one
instance of testing to another. Item format, when it is not substantively important for
the inference, can provide opportunities for non-substantive coaching. A common ex-
ample is advice to capitalize on the multiple-choice format by using the process of
elimination. For example, one book published by the Princeton Review, a major U.S.
vendor of test-preparation materials, advises students that “Sometimes the best way to
solve a problem is to figure out what the…wrong answers are and eliminate them…. It’s
often easier to identify the wrong answers than to find the correct one” (Rubinstein 2002,
p. 15). As this example indicates, many test-taking tricks fall under the rubric of coach-
ing in Koretz et al.’s classification.
Coaching can be focused on other aspects of items, such as the choice of graphical
or pictorial representation. It may also make use of regularities in scoring rubrics, what
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Stecher and Mitchell (1995) dubbed “teaching to the rubric” – as described by one
teacher, “What’s in the rubrics gets done, and what isn’t doesn’t.” Stecher and Mitchell
noted that this “May cause teachers to neglect important…skills not addressed by the
rubrics and neglect tasks not well aligned to [them]” (1995, p. ix).
Coaching can inflate scores because it focuses attention on tested details at the cost
of other content, representations, and task demands. For example, consider the method
of process of elimination. This capitalizes on the use of the multiple-choice format, but
that choice of format is generally irrelevant to the inference. Parents and employers
would expect that students learn mathematical skills that they can apply in the real
world, which rarely provides mathematics problems in that format. Any gains produced
by this strategy will evaporate if the format is changed to constructed-response.
Although in practice, the distinction between reallocation and coaching is not al-
ways entirely clear, the two approaches differ in terms of the mechanism of score infla-
tion. As noted, reallocation can leave estimates of performance for individual elements
unbiased even while inflating total scores. In contrast, coaching can inflate estimates of
performance on individual elements. For example, suppose that one substantive per-
formance element is ‘factoring quadratic equations,’ and students are taught to rely on
process of elimination to solve items testing that element. To the extent that the coach-
ing is effective, it will improve students’ performance on these items more than their
ability to factor quadratic equations warrants.
The following examples illustrate the distinction between substantive and non-
substantive coaching. Both are taken from the Princeton Review’s test preparation ma-
terials for the 10th grade Massachusetts MCAS mathematics assessment. Consider the
test item show in Figure 2, which is taken from an MCAS test. The Princeton Review
materials note that items of this sort, as well as two other types of items involving trian-
gles, appear frequently in MCAS assessments. They labeled these types of items “special
triangle rules,” of which this is the first. They noted: “One triangle rule that is often
tested on the MCAS exam is the third side rule. The rule is: The sum of every to sides of
a triangle must be greater than the third side” (Rubinstein 2002, p. 52). They then ex-
plain the reason why this is true.
This is an example of substantive coaching, taking advantage of an unimportant
substantive detail that recurs from one instance of testing to the next. There is nothing
wrong with the item if it is used infrequently. It is just one performance element sam-
pled from among the many elements in the area of plane geometry that one might con-
sider reasonable to test at this point in students’ schooling. However, it is not so impor-
tant an element that it should be included much of the time in the small set of elements
sampled – in the case of this test, a total of 42 items that count toward a students’ score.
To put this in terms of the framework above, this very fine-grained performance ele-
ment – knowledge of the third-side rule – is probably to small to have its own inference
weight. Rather, it is most likely just one of many small aspects of performance that con-
tribute to a larger whole that does have a substantial weight, perhaps “knowledge of the
properties of basic plane figures.” If the third-side rule were important enough to have
its own inference weight, than this type of test preparation would properly be consid-
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ered reallocation rather than coaching. In either case, however, preparing students for
this particular detail that happens to recur will create an increase in scores that will not
generalize to other, similar tests that happen to sample content differently.
Fig. 2: An item from a 10th grade MCAS mathematics assessment
For an example of non-substantive coaching, consider another example from the same
test-preparation book. The book includes a section devoted to the Pythagorean theo-
rem. It begins:
Whenever you have a right triangle – a triangle with a 90-degree angle – you can use
the Pythagorean theorem. The theorem says that the sum of the squares of the legs of
the triangle (the sides next to the right angle) will equal the square of the hypotenuse
(the side opposite the right angle) (Rubinstein 2002, p. 56).
So far, this is simply a description of the theorem, which could be part of a good les-
son about it. However, the text then goes on to note:
Two of the most common ratios that fit the Pythagorean theorem are 3:4:5 and
5:12:13. Since these are ratios, any multiples of these numbers will also work, such as
6:8:10, and 30:40:50 (Rubinstein 2002, p. 56).
It is this latter point that is emphasized; it is repeated in a prominent box in the
margin of the text, under the phrase “popular Pythagorean ratios.”
Where are these ratios “most common,” and with whom are these ratios “popular?”
They are not particularly common in the real world. In real life out of school, the ratios
can be anything at all, as long as they conform to the rule that c2=a2+b2. They are none-
theless popular among test authors for a non-substantive reason: calculating non-
integer square roots is difficult, and many students who understand the Pythagorean
theorem would nonetheless answer an item about it incorrectly if they were required to
calculate a non-integer solution. If test authors intend to measure knowledge of the
theorem while avoiding this bias, they have only two choices: use these simple ratios, or
make the item one on which students can use a calculator. If the authors choose the first
option, then they have inadvertently created this opportunity for non-substantive
coaching.
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4. Accountability and the Effects of Sampling
The sampling required for constructing tests of broad achievement domains has been a
central concern in psychometrics for many decades. However, the traditional considera-
tion of sampling tacitly assumes “low-stakes” conditions, that is, little incentive for
teachers or students to focus on the tested sample rather than the target of inference.
Because of behavioral responses to testing, sampling takes on a different, and greater,
importance when tests are used for accountability.
Under low-stakes conditions, the adequacy and representativeness of the sample of
tested performance elements is an essential precondition for valid inference. If the
tested sample meets this condition, if there are no efforts to prepare examinees for the
specific tested sample, and if the domain is unidimensional, then the consequence of
sampling of elements is merely unreliability. If one drew different samples to construct
parallel test forms, the performance of examinees would fluctuate from one instance to
the next, but that inconsistency would be simple measurement error, not bias. In the
classical test theory model, an observed score is thus simply a true score plus random
error arising from the sampling of content or random variations in examinee behavior
over time, .X τ ε= + Modern test theory, both generalizability theory and item re-
sponse theory, require more elaborate specifications of error but retain the notion that
inconsistencies arising from the sampling of performance elements are merely meas-
urement error.
If the test and target are modestly multidimensional, as most achievement tests are,
sampling has an additional effect: one tested sample may favor one group over another
because of differential matches to the groups’ curricula. For example, the rankings of
nations in the TIMSS mathematics assessment could be modified by changing the
weights assigned to the five tested content areas because different nations emphasize
different material within the domain of mathematics. However, these additional affects
of sampling are usually minor because when accountability is not an issue, performance
is usually very highly correlated across the subdomains of the target.
In contrast, when teachers or students are held accountable for scores, the effects of
sampling can be much more serious and can include bias – score inflation – as well as
measurement error. The reason is that accountability creates incentives to focus on the
tested sample rather than the domain as a whole. If educators and students respond to
these incentives in the ways describe above, mastery of the tested sample becomes over
time less representative of mastery of the domain from which the sample is drawn. That
is, the correlation between performance on tested and untested elements weakens, and
scores become inflated.
5. Implications
The problem of score inflation described here is not specific to educational accountabil-
ity or to the American context. It is a specific instance of the problem of Campbell’s Law
Koretz: Test-Based Educational Accountability 787
that has been found in many other fields, such as health care (e.g., Bevan/Hood 2006;
Dranove/Kessler/McClellan/Satterthwaite 2003) and social services (e.g., Heckman/
Heinrich/Smith 2002). Economists have warned that holding people accountable using
incomplete measures of performance yields a variety of distortions in behavior (e.g.,
Baker 2002; Smith 1995). The empirical research and theoretical work in the U.S. de-
scribed here has begun to clarify the forms this problem takes in the case of test-based
educational accountability and the specific mechanisms that underlie it.
Therefore, the problem of score inflation can be expected to arise in other nations as
well, and it has important implications for program evaluation, testing, and the design
of accountability systems in education.
The implications for evaluation are obvious and challenging: scores on the tests used
for accountability, taken by themselves, cannot be considered a dependable outcome
variable for evaluating teachers, schools, educational systems, or specific educational
programs. Test-based accountability systems are often considered self-evaluating: if
scores on the test used for accountability increase, the system is assumed to be working.
Given that scores on these tests may rise dramatically even when actual student learning
increases either far less or not at all, this assumption is clearly unwarranted. Moreover, it
is not only overall performance that may be misestimated. Because inflation is highly
variable and remains largely unpredicted, even estimates of relative performance can be
badly biased, which precludes identifying with confidence programs that warrant re-
wards, sanctions, or imitation.
Therefore, to be confident that student learning has improved under a test-based ac-
countability system, one needs additional evidence to confirm or disconfirm perform-
ance on the test used for accountability. The most straightforward evidence is obtained
from an audit test, but it is often the case that none is available, and in such cases, sup-
plementary testing will be required. Other concurrent indicators of performance may
be useful, as may indicators of later performance, such as performance in postsecondary
education. One of the challenges facing those designing accountability systems in
Europe will be deciding which additional measures can be employed for this purpose.
The use of testing systems for accountability also poses challenges for the design of
tests and the operation of testing systems. Although accountability represents a funda-
mental change in the uses of large-scale achievement testing, the field of measurement
has changed relatively little in response. The challenges posed by accountability affect
the entire testing enterprise, from design to validation. Because accountability creates
incentives to focus instruction on the particulars of the tested sample, the predictability
of both substantive and non-substantive performance elements has become a serious
problem both for measurement and for the incentives testing creates for educators and
students. Despite the technical and financial difficulties this will entail, researchers need
to explore the feasibility and impact of reducing this predictability in the design of tests.
The validation of the results of testing systems must also change. Currently, validation
focuses primarily on analysis of the initial representativeness of the sampled material
and on cross-sectional analyses of scores. While still essential, neither of these types of
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evidence can evaluate the validity of gains over time, which is one of the most impor-
tant inferences based on scores in test-based accountability systems.
Score inflation has additional, important implications for the design of educational
accountability systems. Economists working on incentive systems have often pointed
out that the presence of distortions is not in itself reason to avoid implementing an ac-
countability system. Some degree of distortion is inevitable when a complex role, such
as that of a teacher, is reduced to a set of performance indicators, and the presence of
distortion does not in itself indicate that the accountability system has failed. Account-
ability may increase overall performance even if there is considerable distortion.
Nonetheless, the evidence from the research conducted to date suggests that test-
based accountability as it has been implemented in the U.S. – that is, simply holding
educators accountable for scores on one or several tests, while giving little or no weight
to other indicators of performance and avoiding human judgment altogether – is
unlikely to be sufficient. The severity of the score inflation that can arise from this form
of accountability results in untrustworthy and often severely distorted views of im-
provement, and the variability of inflation precludes identifying with confidence rela-
tively effective or ineffective schools.
Yet while the research is sufficient to indicate that this simple approach is problem-
atic, it is does not yet provide clear guidance for the design of better accountability pro-
grams. Both economic and psychometric theory and research on accountability in other
areas suggest alternatives that may be more productive, but we have not yet conducted
the rigorous research needed to test their effects in educational accountability systems.
Therefore, there is a pressing need for experimentation with new approaches to educa-
tional accountability.
Several areas appear particularly important, in addition to experimentation with
new designs of the tests themselves. One potentially important area is using multiple
objective measures to lessen the incentive to focus inappropriately on the content of the
test. It is axiomatic in educational measurement that one should rely on multiple meas-
ures, but we do not yet have empirical evidence of the effects on educators’ behavior
and student learning. We need to explore the effects of adding measures of variables
other than student performance. We need to explore the effects of various ways of using
performance data, such as the choice of summary statistics and performance targets. We
need to explore the practicality and impact of “dynamic” accountability systems that are
modified over time in response to undesired effects on behavior. And perhaps most im-
portant, we need to investigate the effects of various approaches to combining objective
data from tests with subjective judgments by headmasters, inspectors, or others. This is
a large and ambitious agenda, but the severity of the problems evidenced by the simple
systems now in place indicates its importance. The implementation of new accountabil-
ity systems in Europe provides an invaluable but transient opportunity to undertake
this agenda.
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